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DANIEL C. RICHMAN
COOPERATING DEFENDANTS: THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PURCHASING
INFORMATION FROM SCOUNDRELS
Daniel C. Richman*
Only the most unreflective prosecutor can avoid
feeling ambivalent about cooperation. Without the
assistance of defendants willing to trade testimony
for the expectation of sentencing discounts, many
cases worth prosecuting could not be made. But if a
prosecutor maintains any distance from these
defendants - as he must' - he is bound to be
troubled by the magnitude of the discounts that the
federal system (like other systems) gives to coopera-
tors, many of whom rank as some of the most odious
people he has ever met.
The idea of purchasing testimony through
sentencing discounts has a long history, of course,2 as
have condemnations of those who "snitch."3 The
discounts, however, have become far more dramatic
under the federal sentencing guidelines and the
statutory mandatory minimums, whose harsh rigidity
can effectively be turned off upon a prosecutor's
certification that the defendant has rendered "sub-
stantial assistance" within the meaning of § 5K1.1 and
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).4 These discounts, whose magni-
tude is primarily a function of a cooperator's value to
the government, present a special challenge to a
regime committed to proportionality and to sentences
that reflect offense seriousness. Can this disruption
can be justified?
I. The Costs of the Cooperator System
A. Sentencing Equity
From the standpoint of sentencing equity, one of
the most unfortunate aspects of any system that
rewards cooperation is that it can favor the most
culpable defendants. The "mopes" in a criminal
organization might not have much information to
trade, even were they willing to cooperate; the
kingpin or lieutenant is well placed to render
"substantial assistance," often by testifying against
criminal subordinates.' And the adverse effects of
such inequalities in the distribution of information
can be worsened when kingpins endeavor to provide
subordinates with lawyers who advise their clients
against even trying to cooperate. 6
The role that defense attorneys play in exacerbat-
ing the inequities of our cooperation system may well
go beyond the classic "house counsel" scenario. As a
prosecutor, I often had the nagging feeling that the
chief difference between the cooperator and the non-
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cooperating defendant was the attitude of defense
counsel to the venture - an attitude often more
reflective of the lawyer's personal predilections than
her client's interests. A lazy or overextended attorney
can push a defendant into cooperating as a way of
getting rid of the case. The attorney whose
adversarial zeal is powered by economic self-interest
may discourage clients from cooperating, striving to
develop a reputation for standing fast against the
government - a reputation that appeals to the repeat-
players who populate the high end of the market for
legal services. And the ideologically committed
lawyer can shrink from counseling an alliance with
the overpowering state. The scenarios are certainly
not inevitable, but they are all too common. Because
defendants are ill-equipped to properly assess the
risks and benefits of cooperation before they choose a
lawyer, the critical role that attorneys play in coopera-
tion decisions presents yet another challenge to a
sentencing scheme aspiring to reflect moral desert.7
The foregoing factors would plague any system
that gave cooperators sentencing discounts commen-
surate with the value of their information or testi-
mony. The specific mechanism that the guidelines
use for rewarding cooperation, however, is in itself a
separate source of potential sentencing inequities. By
conditioning any "substantial assistance" departure
upon the government's motion, § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e)
give prosecutors a potent, perhaps even necessary,
tool for ensuring that defendants cooperate fully. But
government control over the possibility -and, to
some extent, the degree' - of such departures has
generally been exercised with an insufficient commit-
ment to treating like defendants alike.
To be sure, many U.S. Attorney's Offices try to
promote uniformity by funnelling these issues
through a standing committee. Yet disparities remain,
both within offices and across districts -perhaps
because only the line Assistant responsible for a case
can truly assess whether a cooperator has been
forthcoming and truthful. Nor are these disparities
amenable to judicial review: In the absence of a
cooperation agreement, the government has virtually
unfettered discretion as to when or whether it moves
under § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e). 9 Where there is an
agreement, its provisions will generally leave the
government with the same extent of discretion.10 Not
surprisingly, the government's standards for "sub-
stantial assistance" have been found to vary greatly."
And even were judges able to impose greater unifor-
mity in such standards, they would not likely hear
about yet another aspect of disparity: the readiness of
some prosecutors to certify "substantial assistance"
where none was given, simply to allow a sympathetic
defendant to escape a harsh guideline sentence.12
B. General Deterrence
The costs of our cooperation system are not
limited to its impairment of sentencing equity. They
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also include its effect on general deterrence. The issue
is complex: The use of cooperators does increase the
likelihood that their accomplices will be convicted.
3
The lure of deep sentencing discounts may even
destabilize a criminal conspiracy before the govern-
ment initiates a formal prosecution; such is the
information-forcing power of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
One must wonder at the damage done to the force of
our laws, however, when murderers "walk" because
they were fortunate enough to have others to "rat"
on.
14
As the evocative slang suggests, the issue is not
simply one of deterrence. Our discomfort with
"snitching" runs deep. Perhaps moral opprobrium
attaches only to the "snitch," and not the government
or society that profits from his use. Yet this certainly
was not true in the days of Joseph McCarthy,'" and I
am not sure it is true today.
C. Perjury
Our discomfort may also reflect concern that the
testimony of cooperators is suspect. The risk that an
unscrupulous prosecutor will use his perceived
influence over sentencing to coerce or encourage a
cooperator to manufacture or shade testimony is
always present. Moreover, there is the perhaps
greater risk that a cooperator will independently try
to be "helpful" to a prosecutor, in hopes of greater
leniency, and that the prosecutor will not be able to
separate the truth from the "icing." The prosecutor
fully equipped to assess the truthfulness of a
cooperator's testimony would probably not have
needed to cut a deal in the first place.
To the extent that a cooperator lies, or that all
cooperators have a tendency to lie, the question of
whether we can justify the disruption to sentencing
equity and the diminution of respect for law attribut-
able to our cooperation system might be easily
resolved. But there is no such easy answer because we
lack any hard data as to the extent of such perjury.
Defense counsel will routinely argue to juries that
snitches will say anything to curry favor with the
government, and I suspect that many lawyers actually
believe that (except when they represent a cooperator
they think deserving of leniency). Prosecutors are
convinced that, over time, their feel for cases enables
them to detect and deter cooperator perjury; and they
are confident that, should the occasion arise, they
would have the courage mid-trial to proclaim their
star witness a liar. The truth about cooperator
reliability is obviously somewhere between these
poles, but we know not where, and our ignorance on
this score is one of the most troubling aspects of
cooperation.
Certainly much truthful testimony is gained. The
question therefore becomes whether those gains
justify the costs.
II. The Benefits of the Cooperator System
To ask how important cooperator assistance is to
law enforcement raises an empirical question, but
one with moral overtones. In the first instance, this
might be taken as a question of whether we need to
be devoting so many resources (including the costs of
a disrupted sentencing scheme) to the kinds of cases
requiring cooperator testimony. I do not believe that
this is a fruitful line of inquiry, however.
The government is most likely to "purchase"
accomplice testimony where it cannot obtain equally
effective evidence from eyewitnesses, victims,
documents, and other "untainted" sources. The most
likely setting for cooperator testimony will thus be in
a case involving secretive conduct and no available
victim. Such cases are not amenable to easy classifi-
cation, but they certainly include murder, corruption,
organized crime, as well as narcotics prosecutions. It
would simply be misleading to link an assessment of
the need for cooperators to the debate on the wisdom
and propriety of the "War on Drugs."
Moreover, although cases where the cooperating
kingpin gets a lower sentence than his subordinates
are troubling, the more common scenario occurs
when a criminal organization's leaders, whose
distance from street-level activity insulates them from
informants, undercovers, and surveillance, are
brought down by a cooperating witness recruited
from the lower or middle ranks of the conspiracy.
Without such testimony, the most culpable players
might never get prosecuted. The ultimate effect of
cooperation on horizontal equity is thus an open
question.
The justification of cooperators as a necessary
evil in part rests on the assumption that prosecutors
will use cooperator testimony only as a last resort.
This assumption lacks a firm empirical basis.
Doubtless, some prosecutors, out of risk aversion or
laziness, will "overbuy" - signing up cooperators
where the case would be strong enough without
them, or where additional investigative efforts could
turn up alternative sources of evidence. The problem
might not be significant were the government to
focus on the price it must pay in jury appeal when its
case rests on cooperator testimony. But prosecutors
are notoriously greedy when it comes to evidence,
and the urge to get the "inside" story of a conspiracy
for which-absent cooperator testimony-there is
only external proof, however strong, can be hard to
resist.
The "overbuying" scenario is troubling, but not a
serious challenge to the whole notion of purchasing
testimony with sentencing discounts. Such a
challenge, though, comes from those who suggest
that, rather than trade with cooperators, the govern-
ment should obtain convictions, by plea or trial, and
then procure testimony through grants of immunity.
Any realistic analysis, however, shows this option to
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be illusory. As most prosecutors soon learn, compul-
sion orders and the threat of perjury charges are
generally not effective against a defendant who
chooses not to implicate his co-conspirators. Perjury
cases are rarely brought, hard to prove, and unlikely
to add much time tb sentences that have already been
or will be imposed for serious crimes. If truthful
information is to be obtained from criminals, it
generally must be paid for, and rarely can be coerced.
Sentencing discounts to cooperators may thus be
the only way to get critical testimony in a large class
of cases worth prosecuting. But are the discounts
unnecessarily large? If our goal is to minimize the
disruption to the guidelines' equitable goals attribut-
able to such discounts, limiting them to the minimum
"price" that defendants would accept for their
testimony, I suspect that our prices are inflated across
the board. Yet the explanation for this may also be
related to fairness concerns. The sentences given to
cooperators can reflect not merely consideration for
testimony but also the liberation of judges from the
constraints of a sentencing regime they deem overly
harsh.16 Once again we see the clash between
individualized fairness and horizontal equity that
characterizes nearly all guideline discussions.
Could we minimize the disruption by taking
control of cooperation departures out the prosecutors'
hands? I doubt it. Perhaps judges would be more apt
than prosecutors to disingenuously certify "substan-
tial assistance" where none was given, in order to
accommodate the especially sympathetic defendant.
But there is little basis for believing that. My own
view is that, having lived with a case longer and
having a better feel for its factual nuances, prosecu-
tors are particularly well suited to serve as
"gatekeepers" in this area. Although defense lawyers
often speak of the risk that the government will put
words in a cooperator's mouth, I think the greater
risk is that a "cooperating" defendant will disclose as
little as possible about himself and his associates.
Prosecutors and agents are far more likely to discern
such shading and deception than are judges, but
actually proving that information was withheld can
be difficult indeed. A rule allowing a defendant to
force the governmen't to take its claim about his lack
of candor to a judge thus gives the defendant
bargaining power that serves neither the truthfinding
process nor sentencing equity.
Conclusion
I would be quite surprised if most readers agree
with all the points I have made here. Because the
exchange of cooperation for sentencing leniency is
under-regulated and never the subject of systematic
empirical investigation, the views of every actor or
former actor in the system on this issue will be based
on personal experience or anecdote. So while I think
all can agree that any system allowing such ex-
changes will undermine our commitment to a
sentencing regime based on moral desert and
proportionality, assessments of whether the benefits
from the current cooperation system justify the costs
will diverge widely.
Under the ancient English common law practice
of "approvement," an accused felon who implicated
an accomplice would win a complete pardon upon
the accomplice's conviction. 17 We have made some
progress in confronting the inequities of such a
system. But not much.
NOTES
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